Nash equilibrium design in the interaction model of entities in the customs service system by Fedorenko, R. V. et al.
CORRESPONDENCE Roman V. Fedorenko         fedorenko083@yandex.ru 
© 2016 Fedorenko et al. Open Access terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/) apply. The license permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, on the condition that users give exact credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if they made any changes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Establishing a context  
In the face of the growing international trade turnover a special attention is paid 
to the issue of the effective customs service system of foreign trade, designed to 
provide a reduction in the total cost of moving goods. Both the potential market 
success of the import or export of goods and the competitiveness of the 
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participants of foreign trade activities at the national and international market 
depend on the implementation of customs support.  
Despite the active reforms of the entire customs system, a participant of 
foreign economic activity is still faced with a sufficiently large number of 
problems that require significant time and cost. These problems include a need 
to meet all established requirements by customs legislation, and the solution of 
certain economic issues, such as the organization of movement and storage of 
goods. 
A common approach in solving these problems for a foreign trade operator 
becomes a transfer of functions of customs support to professional dealers on the 
basis of outsourcing. Providing services in the field of customs aims to expedite 
and simplify all necessary customs procedures in foreign trade activity, and it 
will minimize the financial and time costs of foreign trade operators and, 
consequently, increase the efficiency of their work. 
The problem of the effective interaction between the participants of foreign 
trade activities with professional customs dealers is also very important. The 
worsening competitive environment is forcing companies to expand the 
management tools to optimize the use of all available opportunities in today's 
market. 
The modern trend of determining the optimal interaction strategy is the 
economic and mathematical modeling, in particular, the use of tools of game 
theory. 
Literature review  
The literature on strategic management tends to borrow ideas from related 
sciences, for example, from the field of military strategy (Ghyczy et al., 2002; 
McNeilly, 2014), from the field of game theory (Dixit &Nalebuff, 2010). Game 
theory in this case is particularly interesting because it tends to formulate 
general principles of strategic thinking, applicable to the different areas of 
activity. So, T. Schelling (1981) identifies three types of games: combinatorial, 
gambling and strategic. 
According to T. Schelling (1981), a strategic game - a “behavioral situation 
in which the best selection of each player’s actions depends on actions that, as he 
supposes, will be taken by another one. In this case the player knows that his 
actions, in turn, depend on the expectation of another player concerning his 
actions.” In real life, players’ interests overlap and partly they diverge. This 
means that players have to coordinate their actions in terms of latent conflict. 
The result is the need to find an equilibrium position, ensuring the highest 
possible level of satisfaction of the interests of all involved parties. 
P.F. Drucker (2001), one of America's leading theorists of modern 
management, said: “Every organization operates on the basis of its own theory of 
business, in other words, on the basis of a number of ideas about this business, 
its goals, determined results, its consumers and what these consumers value 
and what they pay for. The strategy is a way to implement the business theory 
in practice. The purpose of practice - to give the organization the ability to 
achieve the desired results in an uncontrolled environment.” 
Establishing a research gap 
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Currently, while studying the customs service system in the domestic scientific 
literature most researchers focus on issues of services by the customs 
authorities, while they neglect the activity of professional customs dealers. 
The article represents the issue of interface of divergent interests of foreign 
trade operators and service providers in the field of customs services of export-
import cargoes. The nature of interaction between foreign trade operators with 
professional customs dealers is largely due to their needs. Independent decisions 
of all foreign trade transaction issues for many companies-participants of foreign 
economic activity is too complex task requiring a significant investment of time 
and financial resources, as a result the employment of specialists for these 
companies becomes almost inevitable. So, the analysis of mechanisms of 
interaction between the individual elements and the subjects of the simulated 
system is becoming increasingly important   . 
An effective method of studying the various types of interactions is the 
game theory - a branch of applied mathematics, exploring models of decision 
making under conditions of divergence of interests of the parties (players), 
where each party seeks to influence the development of the situation in its own 
interests. The game is interaction between the parties, whose interests do not 
coincide. 
Aim of the study  
The purpose of the study is to simulate the interaction system between a foreign 
trade operator and a customs dealer, determining the optimal strategy for each 
of them and building Nash equilibrium in the bimatrix game. 
Methodological Framework 
Research methods 
In the course of research the following methods were used: the theoretical 
(formalization, modeling, hypotheses methods, induction and deduction); 
diagnostic (causal, situation); empirical (observation, experiment); methods of 
mathematical statistics and graphic results. 
Experimental research base 
ExperimentalresearchbasewereSamaraCustomsandentitiesofnear-
customsinfrastructureoftheSamararegion. 
Research stages 
The study was conducted in two stages: 
At the first information retrieval stage the authors analyze scientific 
approaches to the use of economic-mathematical tools in management, 
generalize Russian and foreign experience of mathematical modeling of the 
interaction system of independent entities in the economic system, develop a 
model of the customs service. The empirical study at the first stage was aimed at 
revealing the contradictions goals, objectives and basic strategies for work of 
foreign trade operators and customs dealers. 
 At the second formative stage, the authors develop a model of a bimatrix 
game, which parties are a customs dealer and a foreign trade operator. In order 
to find the optimal strategy of interaction between players, the authors design 
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Nash equilibrium, and define possibilities for maximizing the payoff of each 
party. 
Results 
Identification of possible strategies of players  
As a unit of analysis will be taken a foreign trade operator and a customs 
dealer, that has the greatest value in the subsystem services in the field of 
customs. Let’s consider a bimatrix game in which each player has two strategies, 
conventionally designated by the term “trick” and “cooperation.” 
The player A – a customs dealer - implements two strategies: 
A1 – to use the simplest form of declaration (“deceive the customer”); 
A2 - to use the most favorable declaration form for the customer 
(“cooperation”). 
This division is based on the low interest of the customs dealer in the use of 
modern forms and methods of customs clearance and customs control. Using low 
customer qualification in matters of customs clearance, the customs dealer fills a 
declaration by a pattern, spending minimum time on it, without offering the 
customer more complex possibilities of modern customs tools – a preliminary 
declaration, the submission of periodic declarations, the use of technology of 
remote release. 
In turn, player B – a client - implements two strategies: 
B1 – to continue to carry out customs clearance via the same customs dealer 
(“cooperation”); 
B2 - to leave the customs dealer and fill a declaration on his own (“trick”). 
Let us introduce the following notation: parameters in the matrix A, - 
i - income from the supply unit registration by filling a simple declaration; 
I - income from the supply unit registration by filling one of the types of 
complex declarations; 
n - number of filled simple declarations; 
-t – lost profits, determined by lack of time available between the client calls 
for a constant filing of simple declarations; 
T - profit resulting from the lead time between the client calls, which the 
customs dealer gets using one of the types of complex declarations; 
-s - lost profits. 
When using the simple declaration the customs dealer receives a relatively 
small income from each declaration that is compensated in the case of large 
volumes of foreign trade turnover and rapid supply at low labour cost. Then, the 
constant use of only simple technologies turns the customs dealer in a 
mechanical worker, which leads to loss of time to perform template operations, 
does not allow obtaining the necessary experience in the application of modern 
forms of customs clearance and promotes the shortfall of potentially higher 
profits (-t).  
In turn, the constant search for new opportunities to reduce the time and 
financial costs for the client through the application of modern customs tools 
leads to an increase in the professional level of the customs dealer, increasing 
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his appeal and demand in the customs market, that is expressed in the proposed 
model by T parameter. 
We should take into account the lost profit (s), arising from the unnecessary 
effort of the customs dealer in cases where, despite the use of all declaration 
opportunities, the customer leaves. 
To design a matrix of the payoff of the customs dealer it is necessary to look 
at the various combinations of possible moves of the parties (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. A matrix of the payoff of the customs dealer 
Player A B1 B2 
A1 a11=in-t a12=i 
A2 a21= I+T a22= -T+I-s 
Source:It is made by authors 
 
The combination of А1В1 – the customs dealer fills only a simple 
declaration, as the customer uses his services for quite a long time. In case of 
repeated imports the customs dealer fills declarations by a single pattern, 
without spending considerable effort on filling them. Player A receives regular 
income from filling a simple declaration, multiplied by the number of 
declarations, but spends time on the performance of mechanical operations and 
loses the possible profits, as a result his payoff is a11=in-t. 
The combination of А1В2 – the customs dealer fills only a simple 
declaration, and the client goes away, hoping in the future to fill declarations 
himself. The customer leave can be caused by a decrease in profitability of 
foreign trade and the loss of confidence in the dealer and the desire to fill 
declarations by a pattern. The customs dealer receives regular income by filling 
a simple declaration, but the client does not return, as a result the payoff of 
player A is a12=i. 
Combination А2В1 – the customs dealer uses various types of complex 
declaration, and the client continues to use his services. Player A receives 
income from the use of complex forms of declarations, more than when filling a 
simple declaration, and extra time T. The payoff of player A is a21= I+T.  Extra 
time can be formed as a result of the periodic declaration, as well as using the 
pre-declaration. As a result, the customs dealer can get more revenue for the 
filling of a separate declaration, and extra time he can spend on filling simple 
declarations for the same or another client. 
The combination of А2В2 – the customs dealer uses various types of complex 
declarations, and the client goes away, hoping in the future to fill declarations 
himself. Player A gets increased revenue from filling complex declarations, but 
the customer leaves, so the time spent on complex declaration can be considered 
inefficient, as the  customs dealer lost profits, refused other options, and his 
payoff is a22= -T+I-s. 
Let us design the similar matrix of the customer’s payoff with the following 
parameters: 
-p - costs on the customs dealer when filling a simple declaration; 
n - number of filled simple declarations; 
-P - costs on the customs dealer in case of filling one of the types of complex 
declarations; 
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U – customer’s profit in case when he leaves the customs dealer and will fill 
a simple declaration himself;  
u - customer’s profit in case when he leaves the customs dealer and will fill 
complex types of declarations himself; 
W – customer’s profit, if the customs dealer fills a complex declaration, and 
the client continues to cooperate. 
-p and -P parameters characterize the client's costs and determine the cost 
of the services of the customs dealer, and filling of complex declarations leads to 
increased costs.  
The matrix of the customer’s payoff for different combinations of strategies 
for players A and B are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. The matrix of the payoff of the customer 
Player B B1 B2 
A1 b11= -pn b12= U-p 
A2 b21= W-P b22= u-P 
Source: It is made by authors 
 
The combination of А1В1 – the customs dealer fills only a simple 
declaration, as the customer uses his services for quite a long time. The player В 
pays the standard dealer services repeatedly, and the playoff of В is b11= -pn. If 
there are large volumes of foreign trade and a significant number of delivered 
goods, the charges of the foreign trade operator on the customs dealer fees can 
be very high. In a limited range of goods such high costs, a low complexity of 
filling the declaration and the absence of significant changes in its content can 
encourage the client to abandon the customs dealer services and to continue to 
declare himself. 
The combination of А1В2 – the customs dealer fills only a simple 
declaration, and the client goes away, hoping in the future to fill declarations 
himself. The player В pays the dealer services, and, in the case of leaving, he has 
the opportunity to benefit in self filling the declaration. In typical supply of 
unchanged range of goods, the filling of declarations by a pattern obtained from 
the customs dealer, it is a simple task to perform which you need only one 
specialist in customs clearance, as a foreign trade operator in the company 
structure. As a result, choosing such a strategy in this model the payoff of the 
player В can be b12= U-p. 
The combination А2В1 – the customs dealer uses various types of complex 
declarations, and the client continues to use his services. The player В pays for 
services on filling a complex declaration and benefits, expressed as a maximum 
reduction of time and costs for customs supply of foreign trade. At the same 
time, the constant cooperation with the same dealer allows the client to receive 
the most efficient service including delivery under varying conditions. The payoff 
of the player В in the case of continued cooperation is b21= W-P. 
The combination of А2В2 – the customs dealer uses various types of complex 
declarations, and the client leaves him, hoping in the future to fill declarations 
himself. The player В pays for the dealer services to fill a complex declaration, 
and as he leaves, it is possible to obtain benefits u in case of independent use of 
modern methods of customs clearance. In this case, the payoff of the player В is  
b22= u-P. 
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Determination of the effects implementing the chosen strategy 
Differences of payoffs depending on the combinations of strategies put the 
problem of searching for strategies for each player that can bring the greatest 
benefit and the smallest possible loss. Let us calculate the possible payoffs of the 
parties on the basis of the payment matrix from the table 1 and 2, wherein all 
variables are considered positive, besides n>1, U>u, T>t, I>i, P > p.  
 
Table 3. Possible payoffs of the parties  
 
    
For the 
player  А 
-T+I-s i I+T In-t 
For the 
player В 
-pn u-P U-p W-P 
Source: It is made by authors 
 
If this game is performed once, the players would choose only cautious 
strategies, but when the game is replayed the situation is changing. 
Indeed, let us suppose that the player А chooses the strategy А1, and sticks 
to it as long as the player В continues to use his service. In this case, there is the 
combination of А1 В1, in which the long-term cooperation with the same client 
provides the maximum payoff of the customs dealer and the client's payoff is 
minimal. 
High costs for customs clearance may lead to the fact that the customer 
decides to abandon the customs dealer and to fill declarations himself, which 
will result in the combination of А1В2. This corresponds to a situation in which 
the customs dealer always fills a simple declaration, and the client leaves him. 
The client can fill declarations himself without much effort, saving money on the 
dealer services. Then, after a few of these moves А understands it and decides to 
deviate from this condition choosing the strategy А2, as a sole deviation will 
allow him to increase his payoff in filling a complex declaration, which will 
increase the one-payoff . In this case there is a situation А2В2 in which the 
payoff of the customs dealer is minimal, so the dealer will be forced to choose 
thestrategy А2 - either by direct request of the client, or as a result of a 
significant reduction in demand for services on registration of simple 
declarations. 
If we apply modern methods of declaration, it will reduce the total costs of 
the foreign trade operator, as well as improve his efficiency. The customer, 
realizing that he is not deceived, and  is served with the help of modern tools, 
decides to stay as a leave and self-filling of declarations will be more difficult 
than copying a simple declaration. Thus, there is the situation А1В1. 
However, in the absence of proper motivation and the control of the 
customer, the player А is more likely to decide to reduce his own costs and go 
back to the simple filling of declarations that is unnoticed at a low level of the 
customer qualification. As a result, there is the situation А1В1, corresponding to 
the initial position. 
Thus, when the game is replayed many times the players can alternate 
strategies using not only one “pure” strategy but “mixed” strategies, combining 
“friendly” strategies at a certain frequency. 
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Nash equilibrium design   
In terms of variability of possible cooperation strategies the issue is not just 
to find the optimal strategies giving a maximum payoff but to find those 
strategies that provide it when games are replayed. According to Nash theorem, 
the search should be carried out among the states in which the sole deviation of 
any of the players on the chosen strategy does not increase his payoff when 
others do not change their strategies (the players do not have incentive to 
deviation). Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies exists in every finite game, and 
is achieved by finding pairs of such strategies (
** , yx ), for which the following 
conditions are fulfilled: 
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where
*x – the frequency of use ofthe strategy А1 by the player А in 
equilibrium ( 10 *  x ), *y – the frequency of the use of the strategy В1 by the 
player В in equilibrium ( 10
*  y ), ),( ** yxM A – the statistical expectation of 
the payoff (the best average payoff) of the player А when using the strategy А1 
with the frequency 
*x and the player В when using the strategy В1 with the 
frequency 
*y , ),( ** yxM B  - the statistical expectation of the payoff (the best 
average payoff) of the player В when the player А  uses the strategy А1 with the 
frequency 
*x  and the player В uses the strategy В1 with the frequency
*y , 
),1( *yM A  and ),0(
*yM A - the statistical expectation of the payoff (the best 
average payoff) of the player А when using the strategy А1 with the frequency 1 
and 0, respectively, and the player В uses the strategy В1 with the frequency 
*y
, ),(
** yxM B  and )0,(
*xM B  -  the statistical expectation of the payoff (the best 
average payoff) of the player В when the player А uses the strategy А1 with the 
frequency
*x , and the player В uses the strategy  В1 with the frequency 1 and 0, 
respectively. 
Searching for solutions of the given inequality systems by substituting the 
values of the payoffs we get a lot of decisions. For the subsystem (1), it is: 
1) all cases of the form (0, 
*y ), where ;
)1(2
0 *



nisTt
IisT
y  
2) all cases of the form )
)1(2
,( *


nisTt
IisT
x , where ;10
*  x  
3) all cases of the form (1, 
*y ), where 1
)1(2
* 


y
nisTt
IisT
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Many subsystem solutions (2) include: 
1) all cases of the form(
*x , 0), where 1
)1(
* 


x
npUuW
uW
;  
2) all cases of the form ),
)1(
( *y
npUuW
uW


, where 0< y*<1; 
3) all cases of the form (
*x , 1), where 
)1(
0 *



npUuW
uW
x . 
The decision of the game is the vector (
** , yx ), composed of ** , yx common 
for the considered sets. The image of sets in graphs (Figure 1, for the sub-system 
(1) – a bold line, for the subsystem (2) – a dashed line) shows that there is one 
common point С, the result of the intersection of the broken lines, Nash 
equilibrium in the analyzed game. 
 
Figure 1.Graphical presentation of the game solution  
Source: It is made by authors using the Mathcad program 
 
Thus, when the game is replayed many times: 
- for the player А it is optimal to use the strategy А1 (filling simple forms of 
declarations) with the frequency 
)1(
*



npUuW
uW
x and to use the 
strategy А2 (filling complex forms of declarations) with the frequency
)1(
)1(
1 *



npUuW
npU
x , the average payoff is 
)1(
)))(1(())((
),( **



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- for the player B it is optimal to use the strategy B1 (to stay) with the 
frequency 
)1(2
*



nisTt
IisT
y  and to use the strategy  B2 (to leave) with 
the frequency 
)1(2
1 *


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nisTt
inIITt
y , the average payoff is 
)1(2
)())1()1((
),( **



nisTt
inITtUtnsnInTp
yxM B . 
. 
It is easy to check that the equilibrium payoff of the players А and В 
exceeds their payoffs at maximum strategies. 
On the basis of formulas for 
*x  and y* for certain values of the parameters 
the authors obtain the optimal values of the application frequency of the 
strategy of the first and second players. Analyzing the optimal strategy of the 
customs dealer, which is determined by the frequency 
)1(
*



npUuW
uW
x of filling simple forms of declarations, we see that 
the higher the cost of a simple declaration to the client is, it is more useful to 
move to complex forms of declarations, and it is more likely that the customer 
will not leave the customs dealer. The higher the benefit of the client is, when he 
fills simple forms of declarations himself, the faster the customs dealer should go 
from these simple forms, as in the case of a complex declaration there are less 
chances for the customer to leave. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The graph of 
*x  (W-u) 
Source: It is made by authors using the Mathcad program 
 
The greater the difference between the payoff of the complex forms of 
declarations made by the customs dealer, and independent filling of complex 
forms of declarations is, the more the customs dealer uses simple forms of 
declarations (Figure 2), the risk of losing the customer is less because the 
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cooperation on the basis of complex forms indicates a greater benefit of the 
cooperation with the customs dealer. 
Thus, constantly filling the simple declaration, the customs dealer can get a 
maximum income, if the client continues to cooperate with him. If there is a high 
demand for services in customs clearance it is advantageous for the customs 
dealer to use a simple form of declaration, giving him the maximum income. In 
addition, for customers filling of a large number of simple declarations will be 
economically inefficient. The consequence of this strategy of the customs dealer 
becomes a gradual loss of customers as a result of which the income from a small 
number of simple declarations is less than the potential income gained while 
filling the complex declaration. However, the use of complex forms of 
declarations may be disadvantageous to the customs dealer, if there is a high 
possibility that the customer can leave, so the optimal is the mixed strategy. 
Discussions 
The issues of FEA management were studied in detail in the scientific 
works of different authors, and the customs services (Gupanova, 2011), provided 
by foreign economic operators of customs authorities, and the services of the 
customs dealers were analyzed separately (Fedorenko, 2014). The evaluation of 
the role of customs dealers in the development of the foreign economic activity is 
also studied by foreign authors. For example, in the work of Customs Brokerage 
Services and Trade Facilitation: A Review of Regulatory Coherence is stressed 
the importance of customs dealers for the state and for the business 
environment (Llanto et al., 2013). 
However, economic and mathematical tools and the analysis of interaction 
processes of the entities involved in the foreign trade are not fully used in recent 
studies. 
Game approach to solving economic problems was first considered by J. 
Neuman & D. Morgenstern (2007). The founder of the Russian school of games 
theory N.N. Vorobyov (1984) highlights the nature of mathematical game theory 
as a key feature: “Game theory - a theory of mathematical models of optimal 
decision making in conflict situations.” At the moment, if we talk about the 
economic context, it is not only the use of game-theoretic methods to fairly 
traditional problems of industrial organization, and, in fact, to all the variety of 
economic issues (Pecherskii &Belyaev, 2001). 
Nash equilibrium design as a mathematical framework for the analysis of 
the strategy efficiency of the foreign trade operator was used in the work of T. 
Do et al. (2015), dedicated to the problem of determining the strategy for the 
effective development of a major international port. In the course of the study T. 
Do et al. (2015) designed mathematical modeling of interaction between two 
competing entities of the near-customs infrastructure. 
With regard to the organization of the customs service in the Russian 
Federation, game theory is almost not used by modern researchers. N.V. 
Babichev (2010) used game theory to model the process of cooperation between 
the customs authorities and foreign trade operators avoiding payment of 
customs duties. 
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As part of this article game theory is applied to model the process of 
interaction between foreign trade operators and customs dealers. 
Conclusion 
The conducted economic and mathematical modeling led to the conclusion 
that the use of tools of game theory makes it possible to justify the selection of 
mathematical relations strategy in the customs service. This emphasizes the 
importance of the behavior of the other party. For example, the customs dealer 
may receive the maximum income by constantly filling simple declarations, but 
only in condition if the client continues to cooperate with him. If there is a high 
demand for services in customs clearance the customs dealer advantageously 
uses such a strategy that gives him the maximum profit. However, registration 
of a large number of simple declarations is often economically inefficient for the 
customers, which will lead to a change in their behavior. The consequence of this 
strategy is that the customs dealer looses his customers as a result of which the 
income from the filling of a small number of simple declarations is less than the 
potential income from the filling of complex declarations. However, the use of 
only complex forms of declarations may be disadvantageous to the customs 
dealer, as there is a possibility that the customer can leave. Thus, we can 
conclude that the optimal strategy would be the mixed one. The use of economic 
and mathematical tools of game theory, analyzed in this article, allows finding 
the optimal strategy of interaction between participants of the customs service 
system among themselves. 
Recommendations  
The results of this research can be used in the practice of managing a 
complex of services in the field of customs in the modern stage of the 
development of the foreign trade activity at Russian enterprises, requiring 
revising established solutions and minimizing the financial costs of customs 
support. In addition, the research results can be used in the development and 
implementation of training programs for professionals in the field of 
management of foreign trade activity at enterprises. 
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